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DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to recent amendments to the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, a sufficiently severe temporary impairment may 
constitute a disability. Because the district court held to the 
contrary, we reverse and remand.
I.
A.
Carl Summers appeals the dismissal of his complaint for 
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
Accordingly, we recount the facts as alleged by Summers. Minor 
v. Bostwick Labs, Inc., 669 F.3d 428, 430 n.1 (4th Cir. 2012).
In July 2011, Summers began work as a senior analyst for 
the Altarum Institute, a government contractor with an office in 
Alexandria, Virginia. Summers's job required him to travel to 
the Maryland offices of Altarum's client, the Defense Centers of 
Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury 
("DCoE"). At DCoE, Summers conducted statistical research, 
wrote reports, and made presentations. Altarum policy
authorized employees to work remotely if the client approved. 
The client, here DCoE, preferred contractors to work on-site 
during business hours, but permitted them to work remotely from 
home when "putting in extra time on [a] project."
3
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On October 17, 2011, Summers fell and injured himself while
exiting a commuter train on his way to DCoE. With a heavy bag 
slung over his shoulder, he lost his footing and struck both 
knees against the train platform. Paramedics took Summers to 
the hospital, where doctors determined that he had sustained 
serious injuries to both legs. Summers fractured his left leg 
and tore the meniscus tendon in his left knee. He also
fractured his right ankle and ruptured the quadriceps-patellar 
tendon in his right leg. Repairing the left-leg fracture 
required surgery to fit a metal plate, screws, and bone into his 
tibia. Treating Summers's ruptured right quadriceps required 
another surgery to drill a hole in the patella and refasten his 
tendons to the knee.
Doctors forbade Summers from putting any weight on his left 
leg for six weeks and estimated that he would not be able to 
walk normally for seven months at the earliest. Without
surgery, bed rest, pain medication, and physical therapy,
S umme rs alleges that he would "likely" not have been able to
walk for more than a year after the accident.
While hospitalized, Summers contacted an Altarum human- 
resources representative about obtaining short-term disability
benefits and working from home as he recovered. The Altarum
representative agreed to discuss "accommodations that would
allow Summers to return to work, " but suggested that Summers
4
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"take short-term disability and focus on getting well again." 
Summers sent emails to his supervisors at Altarum and DCoE 
seeking advice about how to return to work; he suggested "a plan 
in which he would take short-term disability for a few weeks, 
then start working remotely part-time, and then increase his 
hours gradually until he was full-time again."
Altarum's insurance provider granted Summers short-term 
disability benefits. But Altarum never followed up on Summers's 
request to discuss how he might successfully return to work. 
The company did not suggest any alternative reasonable 
accommodation or engage in any interactive process with Summers. 
Nor did Altarum tell Summers that there was "any problem with 
his plan for a graduated return to work." Instead, on November 
30, Altarum simply informed Summers "that Altarum was 
terminating [him] effective December 1, 2011, in order to place 
another analyst in his role at DCoE."
B.
In September 2012, Summers filed a complaint in the Eastern 
District of Virginia alleging two claims under the Americans 
With Disability Act ("ADA" or "Act"). First, Summers asserted 
that Altarum discriminated against him by wrongfully discharging 
him on account of his disability. Second, Summers asserted that 
Altarum failed to accommodate his disability. After Summers 
amended the complaint in October 2012, the district court
5
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granted Altarum's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed both claims 
without prejudice.
Rather than filing a second amended complaint, Summers 
filed a new lawsuit in December 2012 presenting essentially the 
same two claims. A few months later, the district court again 
granted Altarum's motion to dismiss both claims, this time with 
prejudice. First, the court dismissed the wrongful-discharge 
claim on the ground that Summers had failed to allege that he 
was disabled. The court reasoned that a "temporary condition, 
even up to a year, does not fall within the purview of the 
[A]ct" and so "the defendant's not disabled." The court further 
suggested that Summers was not disabled because he could have 
worked with the assistance of a wheelchair. Second, the court 
dismissed Summers's failure-to-accommodate claim on the ground 
that Summers failed to allege that he had requested a reasonable 
accommodation. The court reasoned that an employee bears the 
burden of requesting a reasonable accommodation, and that 
Summers's proposal to work temporarily from home was 
unreasonable "because it sought to eliminate a significant 
function of the job."
On appeal, Summers challenges only the district court's 
dismissal of his wrongful-discharge claim. He does not contest 
the court's dismissal of his failure-to-accommodate claim, and 
so we do not consider it.
6
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II.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state "a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) . We review de novo an
appeal from a Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal, accepting the complaint 
as true and drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's 
favor. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 
F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009).
A.
The ADA makes it unlawful for covered employers to 
"discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) . The Act prohibits
covered employers from discharging qualified employees because 
they are disabled. Id. To establish a wrongful-discharge 
claim, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he 
suffered from a "disability." Young v. United Parcel Serv., 707 
F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 2013).
Under the ADA, a "disability" may take any of the following 
forms: (1) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one o r more major life activities" (the "actual-
disability" prong) ; (2) "a record of such an impairment" (the
"record-of" prong) ; or (3) "being regarded as having such an
impairment" (the "regarded-as" prong). 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
Summers alleges that he was disabled under the ADA's actual-
7
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disability prong. Specifically, he asserts that his impairment 
"substantially limit[ed]" his ability to walk -- which the ADA 
recognizes as one of the "major life activities" whose 
substantial limitation qualifies as a disability. Id.
§ 12102(2)(A). Accordingly, if Summers's impairment
substantially limited his ability to walk, he suffered a 
"disability" for purposes of the ADA.
B.
In September 2008, Congress broadened the definition of 
"disability" by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 ("ADAAA" or "amended Act") . In 
response to a series of Supreme Court decisions that Congress 
believed improperly restricted the scope of the ADA, it passed 
legislation with the stated purpose of "reinstating a broad 
scope of protection to be available under the ADA." Id. 
§ 2(b) (1) . Particularly relevant to this case, Congress sought 
to override Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199 (2002), in which the Supreme Court
had adopted a strict construction of the term "disability" and 
suggested that a temporary impairment could not qualify as a 
disability under the Act. Congress believed that Toyota set an 
"inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain 
coverage under the ADA." Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5).
8
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Abrogating Toyota, the amended Act provides that the 
definition of disability "shall be construed in favor of broad 
coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum 
extent permitted by [its] terms." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). 
Further, Congress instructed that the term "substantially 
limits" be interpreted consistently with the liberalized 
purposes of the ADAAA. Id. § 12102(4) (B) .1 And Congress
directed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to 
revise its regulations defining the term "substantially limits" 
to render them consistent with the broadened scope of the 
statute. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(6).
After notice and comment, the EEOC promulgated regulations 
clarifying that "[t]he term 'substantially limits' shall be 
construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage" and that the 
term is "not meant to be a demanding standard." 2 9 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2 (j) (1) (i) (2013) . The EEOC regulations also expressly
provide that "effects of an impairment lasting or expected to 
last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting" for 
purposes of proving an actual disability. Id.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (emphasis added).
1 The ADAAA provides, with respect to the "regarded-as" 
prong, that a plaintiff will not be disabled if his impairment 
is "transitory and minor," i.e. of "an actual or expected 
duration of 6 months or less." Id. § 12102(3)(B). It contains 
no similar durational requirement for the "actual-disability" 
prong.
9
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According to the appendix to the EEOC regulations, the 
"duration of an impairment is one factor that is relevant in 
determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major 
life activity." Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix)(app.). Although
" [ i ] mpairments that last only for a short period of time are 
typically not covered," they may be covered "if sufficiently 
severe." Id. The EEOC appendix illustrates these principles: 
"[I]f an individual has a back impairment that results in a 20- 
pound lifting restriction that lasts for several months, he is 
substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting, and 
therefore covered under the first prong of the definition of 
disability." Id.
III.
In dismissing Summers's wrongful-discharge claim, the 
district court held that, even though Summers had "suffered a 
very serious injury," this injury did not constitute a 
disability because it was temporary and expected to heal within 
a year. That holding represented an entirely reasonable 
interpretation of Toyota and its progeny. But in 2008, Congress 
expressly abrogated Toyota by amending the ADA. We are the 
first appellate court to apply the amendment's expanded
10
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2definition of "disability." Fortunately, the absence of
appellate precedent presents no difficulty in this case: 
Summers has unquestionably alleged a "disability" under the 
ADAAA sufficiently plausible to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
A.
Summers alleges that his accident left him unable to walk 
for seven months and that without surgery, pain medication, and 
physical therapy, he "likely" would have been unable to walk for 
far longer.* 3 The text and purpose of the ADAAA and its
In Reynolds v. American National Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143,
151-52 (4th Cir. 2012), we briefly discussed the ADAAA before 
declining to apply the statute retroactively. In the course of 
our discussion we noted that the plaintiff's impairment -- a 
minor lifting restriction -- was not severe enough to constitute 
a disability even under the ADAAA's liberal new standard. Id. 
at 154 n.10. But we did not suggest, let alone hold, that the 
ADAAA excluded temporary impairments from its definition of 
disability.
3 In enacting the ADAAA, Congress clarified that courts must 
disregard so-called "mitigating measures" when determining 
whether an impairment constitutes a disability. Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 2(b) (2) . The new statute and regulations require 
courts to evaluate a plaintiff's impairment as it would manifest 
without treatments such as medication, mobility devices, and 
physical therapy. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(5). A proposed but rejected regulation had included 
as an example of a mitigating measure "surgical interventions, 
except for those that permanently eliminate an impairment." 76 
Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,983 (Mar. 25, 2011). The EEOC omitted this 
example due to the public's confusion over how it would apply, 
instead explaining that whether a given surgery constitutes a 
mitigating measure should be determined "on a case-by-case 
basis." Id. Because Summers's impairment could constitute a 
disability with or without surgery, we need not address whether 
his surgeries constituted mitigating measures.
11
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implementing regulations make clear that such an impairment can 
constitute a disability.
In the amended Act, after concluding that courts had
construed the term "disability" too narrowly, Congress stated
that it intended to liberalize the ADA "in favor of broad
coverage." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (A). Congress also mandated 
that the ADA, as amended, be interpreted as broadly as its text 
permits. Id. Furthermore, the EEOC, pursuant to its delegated 
authority to construe "disability" more generously, adopted new 
regulations providing that an impairment lasting less than six 
months can constitute a disability. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). Although short-term impairments qualify as 
disabilities only if they are "sufficiently severe," id. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (app.), it seems clear that the serious 
impairment alleged by Summers is severe enough to qualify. If, 
as the EEOC has concluded, a person who cannot lift more than 
twenty pounds for "several months" is sufficiently impaired to 
be disabled within the meaning of the amended Act, id., then 
surely a person whose broken legs and injured tendons render him 
completely immobile for more than seven months is also disabled.
In holding that Summers's temporary injury could not 
constitute a disability as a matter of law, the district court 
erred not only in relying on pre-ADAAA cases but also in 
misapplying the ADA disability analysis. The court reasoned
12
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that, because Summers could have worked with a wheelchair, he
must not have been disabled. This inverts the appropriate
inquiry. A court must first establish whether a plaintiff is 
disabled by determining whether he suffers from a substantially 
limiting impairment. Only then may a court ask whether the
plaintiff is capable of working with or without an
accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E) (i)(III) (the
determination whether an impairment is substantially limiting 
"shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of 
. . . reasonable accommodations") . If the fact that a person
could work with the help of a wheelchair meant he was not
disabled under the Act, the ADA would be eviscerated.4
To mount a wrongful-discharge claim, a plaintiff must also 
establish that he is a "qualified individual" -- i.e., that 
"with or without reasonable accommodation, [he] can perform the 
essential functions of [his] employment position." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(8). The district court did not address the "qualified 
individual" issue in the context of Summers's wrongful-discharge 
claim. But in dismissing Summers's failure-to-accommodate 
claim, the court suggested that Summers was not a "qualified 
individual" because his requested accommodation -- a temporary 
period of working remotely -- was unreasonable. Summers does 
not challenge the dismissal of his failure-to-accommodate claim 
and so, as explained above, we do not revisit that holding. But 
because the "qualified individual" issue likely will arise on 
remand of the wrongful-discharge claim, we note that an 
employee's accommodation request, even an unreasonable one, 
typically triggers an employer's duty to engage in an 
"interactive process" to arrive at a suitable accommodation 
collaboratively with the employee. See Wilson v. Dollar General 
Corp. , 717 F.3d 337, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2013) . " [L] iability for 
failure to engage in an interactive process depends upon a 
finding that, had a good faith interactive process occurred, the 
(Continued)
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B.
Despite the sweeping language of the amended Act and the 
clear regulations adopted by the EEOC, Altarum maintains that a 
temporary impairment cannot constitute a disability. In doing 
so, Altarum principally relies on pre-ADAAA cases that, as we 
have explained, the amended Act abrogated. Additionally, 
Altarum briefly advances two other arguments why Summers's leg 
injuries did not "substantially limit" his ability to walk.
1.
First, Altarum contends that the EEOC regulations defining 
a disability to include short-term impairments do not warrant 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Altarum argues that
Congress's intent "not to extend ADA coverage to those with 
temporary impairments expected to fully heal is evident," 
because such a "dramatic expansion of the ADA would have been 
accompanied by some pertinent statement of Congressional 
intent." Altarum Br. 34-35.
When a litigant challenges an agency's interpretation of a 
statute, we apply the familiar two-step Chevron analysis.
parties could have found a reasonable accommodation that would 
enable the disabled person to perform the job's essential 
functions." Id. at 347 (quoting Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. 
Co. , 696 F.3d 78, 91 (1st Cir. 2012))(quotation marks omitted).
14
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First, we evaluate whether Congress has "directly spoken" to the 
precise question at issue. If traditional rules of statutory 
construction render the intent of Congress clear, "that is the 
end of the matter." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If the statute 
is "silent or ambiguous" with respect to the question at issue, 
we proceed to the second step -- determining whether the 
agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Id. at 
843. An agency's reasonable interpretation will control, even 
if better interpretations are possible. Id. at 843 n.11.
Although Altarum contends that Congress's intent to 
withhold ADA coverage from temporarily impaired employees is 
"evident," Altarum Br. 34, no such intent seems evident to us. 
To be sure, the amended Act does preserve, without alteration, 
the requirement that an impairment be "substantial" to qualify 
as a disability. But Congress enacted the ADAAA to correct what 
it perceived as the Supreme Court's overly restrictive 
definition of this very term. And Congress expressly directed 
courts to construe the amended statute as broadly as possible. 
Moreover, while the ADAAA imposes a six-month requirement with 
respect to "regarded-as" disabilities, it imposes no such 
durational requirement for "actual" disabilities, thus 
suggesting that no such requirement was intended. See Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) ("[A] negative inference may 
be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory
15
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provision that is included in other provisions of the same 
statute."). For these reasons, we must reject Altarum's 
contention that the amended Act clearly evinces Congress's 
intent to withhold ADA coverage for temporary impairments. At 
best, the statute is ambiguous with respect to whether temporary 
impairments may now qualify as disabilities.
Accordingly, we turn to step two of the Chevron analysis -­
determining whether the EEOC's interpretation is reasonable. We 
conclude that it is. The EEOC's decision to define disability 
to include severe temporary impairments entirely accords with 
the purpose of the amended Act. The stated goal of the ADAAA is 
to expand the scope of protection available under the Act as 
broadly as the text permits. The EEOC's interpretation -- that 
the ADAAA may encompass temporary disabilities -- advances this 
goal. Moreover, extending coverage to temporarily impaired 
employees produces consequences less "dramatic" than Altarum 
seems to envision. Prohibiting employers from discriminating 
against temporarily disabled employees will burden employers 
only as long as the disability endures. Temporary disabilities 
require only temporary accommodations.
2.
Alternatively, Altarum argues that, even deferring to the 
EEOC regulations, Summers's impairment does not qualify as a 
disability. Altarum maintains that the EEOC regulations do not
16
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apply to Summers's impairment because those regulations do not 
cover "temporary impairments due to injuries" even if they do 
cover "impairments due to permanent or long-term conditions that 
have only a short term impact." Altarum Br. 37.
But, in fact, the EEOC regulations provide no basis for 
distinguishing between temporary impairments caused by injuries, 
on one hand, and temporary impairments caused by permanent 
conditions, on the other. The regulations state only that the 
"effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than 
six months can be substantially limiting" -- they say nothing 
about the cause of the impairment. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).
Nor do the regulations suggest that an "injury" cannot be 
an "impairment." Rather, the EEOC defines an impairment broadly 
to include "[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body 
systems," including the "musculoskeletal" system. Id. 
§ 1630.2(h) (1) . This expansive definition surely includes 
broken bones and torn tendons. And the EEOC elsewhere uses the 
terms "injury" and "impairment" interchangeably. See id. 
§ 1630.2(j)(5) n.3 (app.); id. § 1630.15(f) (app.).
In sum, nothing about the ADAAA or its regulations suggests 
a distinction between impairments caused by temporary injuries 
and impairments caused by permanent conditions. Because Summers
17
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alleges a severe injury that prevented him from walking for at 
least seven months, he has stated a claim that this impairment 
"substantially limited" his ability to walk.
IV.
Under the ADAAA and its implementing regulations, an 
impairment is not categorically excluded from being a disability 
simply because it is temporary. The impairment alleged by 
Summers falls comfortably within the amended Act's expanded 
definition of disability. We therefore reverse the district 
court's dismissal of Summers's wrongful-discharge claim and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
18
